Crypto-Current (046)

§4.7 — The potentialities of large multi-agent games are not predictable in advance, by anything less complex than themselves. They are not compressible except by increasingly unreliable approximation. In consequence, their systemic behavior is surprising – or informative. In Kantian terms it is said to be synthetic. Like all complex adaptive systems, such games are synthesizers, whose coordination searches produce discoveries. They are modeled by simulations which themselves demonstrate synthesis. The conclusions reached by simulating the behavior of complex systems were not analytically accessible (‘in advance’). They were not even accessible before, in the narrowest empirical-historical sense. Were there an essential trans-historical faculty of reasoning, it was unable to reach them. Computers were required to do that. The game, if it is serious enough, has to produce – in detail – its own conditions of cognitive apprehension within itself. The most elementary perception is already ‘a move’, downstream from strategy. Nothing is given, everything has to be won.

§4.71 — The intractability of such games to adequate simplification does not follow from any ineffable characteristics of their component agencies, but from the sheer number of independent nodes. A game, or network, is able to be more or less intrinsically numerous. It would be understandable, if finally misleading, to gloss this spectrum as a measure of intractability to coordination. The initial plausibility of some such deciphering is informative, nevertheless, since it acknowledges resistance to unification, or resilient diversity, as a quantitative axis of variation.[1] Numerousness is not only the context of strategy, but in certain significant cases its objective. In one direction, the primary – if typically tacit – aim is to become more, in the sense of many. In the other, alternative imperatives prevail, and robust distribution is assumed rather than positively targeted.[2] The distinction between Bitcoin Ultras and Mainstreamers is flush with such an axis.

§4.72 — In respect to the systems (games, networks) relevant here, decentralization, numerousness and complexity are roughly equivalent, and argumentatively interchangeable. In order to facilitate formalization, it is theoretically tempting to hold the number of players or nodes down and constant. Yet methodological convenience in this case has a theoretical cost, and one that is finally unaffordable. It makes of multiplicity a transcendent parameter. In other words, the complexity of the game is treated as an extrinsic frame, independent of all strategic inclinations within the game. As we have seen, the implicit assumption thus made is questionable under any actual circumstances. Under those of unfolding crypto-currency dynamics, it becomes an intolerable obstacle to understanding. It should have long been uncontroversial – given the existence of an overt ideology oriented to decentralization – that the multiplicitous, as such, is able to constitute a strategic objective. Thus, the complexity of a game – as measured by the number of agents involved – is not only a parameter, but also a factor in the payoff matrix, making a contribution to calculations of success or failure, victory or defeat. Bitcoin ‘politics’ is unintelligible except as a game of this type. For at least one of the parties in competition, concentration counts as a loss. This holds equally for conflicts about, and within it. The architecture of the game is folded into the game, projecting a diagonal line. Recursion is basic. The spiral is irreducible.   

§4.73 — It might be asked (and, in fact, increasingly is being asked): does Bitcoin adequately incentivize the decentralization of its own machinery? Concretely, this question addresses the protocol’s horizon of practical controversy. The final stakes of the block-size debate manifestly belong here. Posed a little differently, the problem is this: If the block-size debate remains ulterior to the operation of Bitcoin, a metaphysical order has been preserved. Bitcoin, as a game, has not then been (cybernetically) closed. An extraneous decentralization imperative – perhaps inherited from precursor crypto-anarchist commitments – would, under such circumstances, continue to impose a secret dependency. The distribution of the system would still rely upon supplementary incentives, which is to say upon partisans, who were not merely players, but also supporters. The passage into autonomization would not, in reality, have been made. The polemical formulation: If Mainstreaming can work, Bitcoin has failed.

§4.74 — The name Bitcoin, at its point of philosophical extremity, designates a game that ‘automatically’ – i.e. mechano-liberally – produces and protects its distribution. This is so even if the adequacy of its actual application remains in doubt. Such a thing has now been thought, with unprecedented technical rigor. It operates as an effective model. Arguments from principle can no longer scratch it. The game is diagonalized when it makes a strategic objective of its own complexity. The existence (persistence) of the game, and actually its inherent escalation, defines a ‘victory condition’. Thus, the conditions of spontaneous order are extracted from transcendence, and re-instituted as rewarded performances. A meta-market is realized, in which the trade-matrix becomes an object of commercial attraction. The invisible hand, Escher-style, draws itself. Cybernetic closure is achieved. At the transcendental horizon of this tendency lies auto-production. Much – if not all – of this is already captures by the near-truism the value of Bitcoin lies in the network.

§4.75 — The human (social) animal is an amphibian between the public and private, irreducibly. This is a distinction drawn between the game and its allotted player-positions. Between the two there is real difference, but no true option. Public and private are not alternatives, but co-dependent components of a system.[3] As asymmetric cryptography demonstrates, the distinction between a public key and a private key is neither an illusion nor a choice. The relation is in the strictest sense co-operative, or co-efficient. … To understand the PPD simply as a contest between the public and the private, therefore, can only be a misleading simplification. The more substantial questions involve the reducibility of the public sphere to the state, or the private sphere to the enjoyment of collectively-allotted rights. There is a transcendent hypostasis of the public sphere on one side, and of collective subjectivity on the other. Either a privileged agent (‘the state’) is identified with the whole, or the whole (‘the people’) is conceived as a possible agent. Both errors break the public-private distinction in their attempt to ideologically operationalize it. The game is collapsed into an agency (within the game). This is the way sociology does metaphysics. It represents decentralized order through elevated agencies (“trusted third parties”). A fantastic crystallization of public purpose is the consistent – and philosophically-predictable – result.[4] Even economics has fallen prey to it.

[1] Decentralization remains drastically under-conceptualized. The rigorous quantification of decentralization is more than a reflective supplement to an underlying socio-historical process. It can be expected to play an increasingly indispensable functional role. Balaji S. Srinivasan and Leland Lee take a crucial initial step in correcting the prevailing neglect.

[2] A long historical learning process lies behind the contemporary configuration of this controversy. It has involved the gradual emergence of the culture of capitalism as an explicit product, rather than merely (and implicitly) a resource. Daniel Bell’s The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976) is a milestone reference. Does the capitalistic process in motion reproduce, or erode, its cultural conditions of perpetuation? Does it, in other words, attain cybernetic closure? When this question is hardened into an objection, it conforms structurally to a species of ecological criticism. A non-renewable resource is inadequately accounted. Capitalism burns through its cultural preconditions, in the same way industrialism burns through fossil fuel deposits (without any capacity to manufacture them).  

[3] Any social entity is functional (or competitive) insofar as its private and public aspects cooperate, or work together. To place cooperation on the public side of the division, through contrast to private competition, cannot therefore be conceptually coherent. Any such articulation illustrates the socialist confusion – typically more earnest than cynical – of the public with the collective or gregarious, and then subsequently, as also more malignantly, with the state. There is no ‘public sector’ outside ideological myth, but only a public sphere, which is entirely distinct from the state agencies that strategically misidentify themselves as such. The public cannot be institutionally instantiated. To imagine otherwise is a stark example of pre-critical or metaphysical error. It is rare for a theoretical temptation to be so seductive, or so luridly erroneous.

[4] The cultural homology with a religious myth of incarnation is unmistakable. When conceived as a positive philosophical project of social theology, the outcome is Hegelianism, which is to say speculative metaphysics without regret.

Leave a Reply